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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the 
annual Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research 
projects funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School 
of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote 
speakers, plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show 
and social events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid 
environment where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry 
officials, accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate 
on finding applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and 
processes within the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of 
industry and academia, the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and 
collaborations which can identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, 
contract, financial, logistics and program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, 
electronic copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, 
please visit our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
Symposium during the third week of May, please visit our conference website at: 
www.researchsymposium.org  
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1 This paper draws from Greenfield, V.A., & Camm, F. (2005). Performance and risk management 
in the Balkans Support Contract (MG-282-A). Santa Monica, CA: RAND, which can be found in its 
entirety at www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG282/; a related presentation developed by Victoria 
A. Greenfield for “Contractors on the battlefield: Learning from the experience in Iraq,” held at The 
George Washington University on January 28, 2005, and a paper presented at a conference of 
the American Bar Association on March 3, 2006.  We thank the sponsors of the originating RAND 
report; however, we bear sole responsibility for all errors or omissions and for the views 
expressed in this paper, which are our own and do not reflect those of our employers or the 
research sponsor. 
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For centuries, the US military has wrestled with decisions about when and how to 
use private contractors, especially “Contractors on the Battlefield.”  Reports of mixed 
performance, inexperienced contracting officers, miscommunication, and profiteering 
date back to the Revolutionary War.  History may be “living history,” in part, because 
decision-makers have lacked adequate means of systematically anticipating future 
outcomes and harvesting lessons from the past.  The US military’s risk-management 
framework, a familiar tool in other operational settings, may fill that void.  To illustrate, 
this paper applies the framework to the Army’s Balkans Support Contract (BSC); the 
contract covers a variety of life support, transportation, and maintenance services and 
has registered a substantial track record in deployment.  The application demonstrates 
the utility of the risk-management framework and draws general lessons from the BSC 
experience for selecting service providers and for contract development, management, 
and oversight.  Four deceptively simple lessons emerge from the analysis: first, not all 
risks are inherently contractual; most are environmental or activity-based. Second, risk is 
dynamic; appropriate responses change over time. Third, a contract is only as good as 
its customer; design and execution determine outcomes. And fourth, risk management is 
not risk elimination; not all risk can or should be eliminated. 
Introduction 
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For centuries, the US military has wrestled with decisions about when and how to 
use private contractors, especially “Contractors on the Battlefield.”  Under what 
circumstance should it hire contractors and, if it does hire them, what can it do to insure 
that it gets what it wants, when it wants it, at a reasonable cost? 
Shrader (1999, p. 3) describes the use of contractors in the Revolutionary War 
and the apparent timelessness of the Army’s experience: 
The Army experience with private contractors in the War for Independence 
contained most of the elements which would characterize the later use of 
contractors on the battlefield: mixed results in terms of performance and 
adequate support for the troops; lack of experience and expertise on the part of 
Army officers in dealing with contractors; lack of clarity in communications 
between the Army and supporting contractors as to requirements, capabilities, 
and costs; and financial manipulation and desire to increase profits at the 
expense of the Army on the part of contractors. 
Much of what Shrader describes rings true today, but why?  History may be 
“living history,” in part, for reasons of resources and culture, e.g., the number of billets 
allocated to contract oversight and the relative status of contracting officers, and, in part, 
for reasons of analytical capability: decision-makers have lacked adequate—both 
tractable and broadly applicable—means of systematically anticipating future outcomes 
and harvesting lessons from the past.  A prospective analysis would enable planning, 
and a retrospective analysis would enable evaluation. 
The US military’s risk-management framework, a familiar tool in other operational 
settings, offers one possible means of filling the analytical void: it is simple and easy to 
use and can be replicated under wide-ranging circumstance.  The framework consists of 
a 5-step continuous risk-management process—(1) identifying hazards, (2) assessing 
hazards, (3) developing controls and making risk decisions, (4) implementing controls, 
and (5) supervising and reviewing—and a complementary risk-assessment matrix.  
Decision-makers can use the framework to recast “when” and “how” in terms more 
amenable to systematic analysis: what risks does contracting present; how do they 
compare to the risks involved in using US military, host nation, or other support; and 
how, if at all, can any or all of those risks be mitigated—and at what cost? 
To illustrate, this paper applies the risk-management framework to the Army’s 
Balkans Support Contract (BSC).  With particular attention to hazard identification and 
assessment, the application demonstrates the utility of the framework and draws general 
lessons from the BSC experience for selecting service providers—of different types—
and for contract development, management, and oversight. 
We chose the BSC because it covers a variety of life support, transportation, and 
maintenance services, and it has registered a substantial track record in deployment.  
Prior to the war in Iraq, it was also the largest contract of its kind, both in terms of dollars 
and contract staff.  Among its limits as a case study, the BSC does not cover all types of 
services—it does not, for example, provide weapon system support. 
In the sections that follow, we review the origins, principles, and structure of the 
BSC as the basis for analysis, present and apply the US Military’s risk-management 
framework, and summarize our findings. 
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BSC Origins, Principles, Structure, and Participants 
The BSC, as described in this paper, began operating in 1999, but can trace its 
roots to the first Logistics Civil Augmentation Plan (LOGCAP) contract, which the Army 
awarded to Brown and Root Services, now Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR), in 1992.2  
The Army established LOGCAP as a performance-based, indefinite-delivery-indefinite-
quantity (IDIQ), pre-planned umbrella contract, capable of delivering a wide range of 
services worldwide, in contingencies or crises, on demand.  Flexibility and 
responsiveness are central concepts in LOGCAP and other such contracts. 
 A performance-based contract tells the contractor what the customer wants 
done, but does not tell the contractor how to do it.  The contractor is free to 
leverage its resources, including expertise. 
 An IDIQ contract does not specify the delivery date or exact quantities at the time 
of the award; instead, the customer orders services and work under the contract, 
as needed.  This level of generality can accommodate uncertainty about timing 
and quantities. 
 In a pre-planned contract, the contractor develops an implementation plan for a 
future contingency, ideally in close collaboration with the customer.  The plan 
should cover all activities posited in the statement of work, potentially reducing 
turnaround times on service and work orders. 
 An umbrella contract covers a broad range of activities, hence the term 
“umbrella,” but the customer can choose to turn to other service providers on a 
task-by-task basis as it sees fit; indeed, under certain circumstances the 
customer must consider using other providers, including other contractors, US 
military personnel, and host-nation support. 
The Army activated the LOGCAP contract in the Balkans in 1995.  In 1997, the 
Army replaced the Balkans element of the LOGCAP contract with a sole-source contract 
and, almost two years later, the Army awarded the BSC in an open competitive process 
based on “best overall value.”  The selection factors for the BSC award consisted of: the 
management execution plan, the contractor’s experience, the contractor’s past 
performance, and cost (CETAC, 1998).  The cost factor spoke to realism, completeness, 
and financial capability, but not directly to level.  The selection process weighed all non-
cost factors equally—together, they were deemed “significantly more important” than 
cost—and considered performance risk for all four factors. 
                                                
2 The BSC is now in its second iteration; the first, as described in this paper, expired in 2004.  On 
June 21, 2005, the Army awarded a re-specified firm-fixed-price and cost-plus-award-fee contract 
to KBR for a 5-year term; the Army solicited 66 bids on September 29, 2003, and received three.  
The contract’s spending limit is $1.25 billion.  (For more information, see 
www.defenselink.mil/contracts and Halliburton (2005) at www.halliburton.com.)  This paper 
addresses the terms of the BSC as established in 1999 and modified over the primary period of 
research encompassed in Greenfield and Camm (2005), i.e., 2001-2003.  For a much more 
detailed treatment of the contract, see Greenfield and Camm (2005), which draws material from: 
CETAC (1998), CETAC (1999), CETAC (2001), and CETAC (2002); CETAC-OC (1997); Kolar 
(1997); McElroy (1999); USACE (1994); Wynn (2000); and others.  For a particularly readable 
overview of the contract and the roles of its participants, see Wynn (2000). 
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The principles and structure of the BSC closely mirror those of the original 
LOGCAP contract and impart similar flexibilities to both the customer and the contractor.  
The BSC is also a performance-based, IDIQ, pre-planned umbrella contract.  As such, 
the contract confers an opportunity, but not an obligation to obtain life support, 
transportation, and maintenance services.  The performance-based work scope tells the 
contractor what needs to be done, e.g., that the Army requires laundry, food, waste 
removal, road repair, or other services, but it does not tell the contractor how many 
people or what type of equipment to use. 
And, as was true of the LOGCAP contract, the BSC is also a cost-plus-award-fee 
(CPAF) contract. 
The CPAF payment structure warrants further consideration, especially with 
regard to the incentives it creates for cost control and cost inflation.  The bases for 
award-fee calculations, cost reimbursement, and future contract awards each play a part 
in determining those incentives. 
First, award-fee payments are calculated on the basis of negotiated estimated 
costs, not actual costs, and they depend on the results of regularly scheduled 
performance evaluations.  In the BSC, the contractor may obtain an award-fee payment 
of up to 8% of the negotiated estimated cost, depending on its performance rating.  If, for 
example, the contractor receives a perfect score in a performance evaluation and the 
estimated negotiated cost of the service it provides is $100, then it would receive an $8 
award-fee payment; if the estimated negotiate cost is $50, it would receive a $4 award-
fee payment; and so on.  If it receives a less-than-perfect score, it would receive a pre-
determined fraction of the $8 or $4 award-fee payment. 
If actual costs differ from estimated costs, the award-fee payment will only 
change if the difference affects the contractor’s performance rating, which would 
depend, in turn, on the specification of the performance-evaluation criteria.  If cost is 
among the criteria, the contractor might obtain a higher rating (and payment) for lower 
costs and a lower rating (and payment) for higher costs.  The BSC criteria have to 
varying degrees addressed cost, quality, coordination, flexibility, and responsiveness. 
Second, CPAF means that the Army reimburses only those costs that are 
“reasonable,” “allowable,” and “allocable” under the contract (Wynn, 2000, p. 6).  The 
Army must approve the expenditure.  If the contractor spends above and beyond the 
cost estimate, the contractor may not get that approval.  Moreover, even if the contactor 
gets the approval, it may, as already noted, obtain a lower rating in its performance 
evaluation, which would, in turn, result in a lower award-fee payment. 
Third, if the contractor develops a reputation for inflating costs; that is, spending 
above and beyond the negotiated estimated costs, the Army might not view it favorably 
in future competitions for other contracts. 
Together, these three considerations suggest that, once the customer and 
contractor have finished negotiating the cost estimate, the CPAF structure provides little 
or no incentive to inflate cost, could provide incentive to control cost, and may even 
provide incentive to reduce costs, if reductions result in higher performance ratings.  
Inflating cost will not generate more award fee; indeed, it may result in less fee and 
fewer future contract awards.  However, tensions may arise when quality is also a 
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criterion, particularly if additional spending can improve the quality of service.3  Higher 
costs, all else constant, might result in a lower performance rating, but higher quality, all 
else constant, might result in a higher rating.  The contractor’s response to these 
competing incentives would depend on their relative weights and net effect in the 
evaluation process, which would also depend on the preferences of the customer. 
Ultimately, the CPAF structure places the burden on the customer to clearly 
establish and articulate its needs and preferences in developing the contract, to 
scrutinize the contractor’s plans, to firmly negotiate appropriate cost estimates, to closely 
review actual costs when the contractor presents them for approval and reimbursement, 
and to uphold its preferences in the performance-evaluation process.  The analysis of 
the BSC that follows confirms each of these points in part or whole. 
Finally, the contract’s participants constitute a near “cast of thousands,” spanning 
the globe, contributing a range of talents, skills, and other resources, and representing 
diverse and sometimes conflicting interests.  For example, US Army Europe in Germany 
is the bill-payer; the operational units deployed in the theater are among the end-users; 
the US Army Corp of Engineers in Winchester, VA, provides the Principle Contracting 
Officer (PCO); and the contractor, KBR in Houston, TX, provides service.  The Defense 
Contract Management Agency and the Defense Contract Audit Agency also provide 
substantial administrative support.  Notwithstanding several foregoing references to “the 
customer” as if it were a single monolithic entity, the interests of the bill-payer, end-
users, PCO, and others are not necessarily the same and at times may be at odds with 
one another.  In particular, end-users may want more or better service from the contract 
and the bill-payer may want lower cost, leaving the PCO to address resulting frictions.  
Given the PCO’s “location” between the end-users and the bill-payer, he or she may 
have a strong interest in minimizing those frictions. 
The Risk-management Framework 
Army and joint doctrine (Department of the Army, 1998; Department of the Army, 
Marine Corps, Navy, & Air Force, 2001) provide a risk-management framework that can 
be used to identify hazards, assess their probability and severity, establish risk-
mitigation measures or risk controls, and compare risks and potential responses across 
alternative service providers.4  The framework consists of a 5-step continuous risk-
management process and a complementary risk-assessment matrix.  The doctrine 
focuses on tactical and operational considerations, but refers to other applications, 
including contracting.  Discussions with Army and other military personnel suggest that 
                                                
3 Economists would also note two other considerations: first, the possibility of low-balling in the 
negotiation to win the award, with the intent to charge actual, higher costs later; and, second, the 
possibility of inflating costs in the current period to increase the value of contracts in later periods.  
In the first instance, issues of reimbursements and award-fee determinations could discourage 
low-balling.  In the second instance, another factor would come into play, i.e., the potential for 
future gain.  The contractor would need to assess the effect of its current behavior on the 
likelihood of winning a future contract and weigh the possible sacrifice of current earnings, e.g., 
through loss of reimbursement or award-fee payment, against the value added to future 
contracts, appropriately discounted. 
4 Greenfield and Camm (2005) offer a more detailed treatment of risk, the risk-management 
framework, and the applicability of the framework. 
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the underlying concepts are ingrained in their thinking about deployment generally, but 
not in their thinking about the use of contractors specifically. 
The Army5 defines risk as the, “chance of hazard or bad consequences; the 
probability of exposure to chance of injury or loss from a hazard; risk level is expressed 
in terms of hazard probability and severity” (Department of the Army, 1998, p. Glossary-
2).  The Army further defines hazard as, “a condition or activity with potential to cause 
damage, loss, or mission degradation” and any actual or potential condition that can 
cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment and 
property; or mission degradation (Department of the Army, 1998, pp. Glossary-1 and 2-
2).6  In loose, non-technical terms, “bad things” can happen in a field operation or 
elsewhere, with varying degrees of likelihood and impact. 
The 5-step risk-management process unfolds as follows: 
First, “Identify hazards” by analyzing the mission, listing possible hazards, and 
listing their causes.  This step is forward-looking: for example, a hypothetical planner 
faces concerns about a service provider’s performance, e.g., will food be cold or roads 
impassable (see the discussion in the following section).  The planner identifies specific 
“bad things” and, perhaps as importantly, their causes.  Failure to identify the causes—
especially the sometimes less obvious root causes—could lead a planner to suggest the 
wrong type of risk control, which could either leave the risk unchecked or create 
additional risk.  An assertion that “bad things can happen” won’t suffice. 
                                                
5 The Army (1998) and joint (2001) doctrine each make use of slightly different vocabulary in their 
discussions of risk; this analysis draws primarily from the Army doctrine. 
6 Department of the Army (1998, p. ii) defines “mission” as including “mission, operation, or task.” 
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Step 1: Identify Hazards
Analy ze mission List hazards List causes
MISSIONS
Step 5: Supervise  and Review
Supervise Review Feedback








Step 2: Assess Hazards
Assess hazard severity
Assess hazard probability
Determine risk level for each 
hazard and overall mission risk
Step 3: Develop 
Controls and Make 
Risk Decisions










Figure 1.  A 5-step Continuous Risk-management Process  
(Department of the Army (1998); Department of the Army et al. (2001)) 
 
Second, how likely is it that the “bad things” will happen and how bad are they?  
This step, assessing hazard probability and severity, can be used to establish priorities 
for allocating resources and, speaking to the issue at hand, determining whether or not a 
contract is an appropriate vehicle.  As shown in Figure 2, Army doctrine provides a 
simple matrix for addressing the issues.  Third, develop controls and make risk 
decisions.  With a reasonable understanding of the hazards and their potential 
consequences, the planner can develop controls, determine residual risk, and make risk 
decisions.  The process instructs the planner to make decisions about how much risk to 
accept, implying that it may not be possible or appropriate to eliminate all risk.  Fourth, 
implement controls in the operating environment and, if possible, before entering the 
operating environment.  Fifth, supervise and review the process and develop new 
controls.  This step enables continuous feedback.  At this stage, it may be helpful to re-
invoke steps one and two to review any realized hazards—what “bad things” have 
actually happened, what caused them, and how bad are they? 
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Figure 2. Risk-assessment Matrix: How Likely and How Bad?  
(Department of the Army (1998); Department of the Army et al. (2001)) 
 
The BSC in Theory and Practice 
This section focuses on applications of Steps One and Two of the 5-step 
process: first, in a prospective assessment of underlying hazards in the BSC; second, in 
a retrospective assessment of the contract’s performance. 
Underlying Hazards 
Two broad categories of hazards emerge from a review of the BSC work scope 
and its operating environment.  One category relates to the performance and cost of 
day-to-day activities, such as food preparation, laundry, road repair, and waste removal; 
the other to higher-order concerns about mission success, force management, and 
safety and security.7  Context matters.  Faulty road repairs may delay a postal delivery in 
one instance and prevent troops from reaching the battlefield in another. 
Framed in terms of the risk-assessment matrix in Figure 2, a planner might rank 
most day-to-day hazards as negligibly or marginally severe and most higher-order 
hazards as critically or catastrophically severe. 
In some instances, hazards across and within categories are interrelated.  For 
example, seemingly minor day-to-day problems can give rise to higher-order concerns 
over time.  If quality-of-life suffers, e.g., if food is cold, laundry is dirty, and latrines 
overflow, the Army may have difficulty recruiting and retaining troops.  Moreover, if the 
                                                
7 Mission success includes readiness. 
  
                  Acquisition Research: CREATING SYNERGY FOR INFORMED CHANGE      - 199 - 
 
costs of these services are too high,8 the Army may eventually run short of funding for 
other mission-essential activities.  Hazards may also involve trade-offs between 
competing objectives, especially cost and quality.  Typically, the customer must pay 
more to get more, sometimes, as already noted, causing tension and friction among 
contractors, bill-payers, end-users, and PCO’s. 
Categorizing and recognizing relationships among hazards is important to 
understanding the nature of risk; but drilling down to underlying causality yields equally 
important insight for developing risk controls. 
Consider an anecdotal example: a soldier returns from a late shift, cannot get a 
hot meal, and complains.  The immediate hazard is the lack of a hot meal, but what is 
the cause?  The most obvious answer might be, “a closed kitchen,” possibly because the 
contractor is short staffed, but the terms of the BSC point elsewhere.  The BSC directs 
the contractor to “Provide 24-hour food service operations”; however, it also calls for 
“limited food service during non-meal hours” (CETAC, 1998).  As such, the contract does 
not require hot meals after the late shift.  It permits and arguably directs the opposite.  In 
this case, the “cause” is the underlying statement of work.  The customer is getting what 
it asked for, nothing more and nothing less. 
Had the analysis ended with a closed kitchen or short staffing, a planner—or 
reviewer—might have suggested the wrong control, perhaps a staffing mandate, which 
might have increased cost, but would not have solved the problem. 
As this example suggests, one possible source of hazard is the contract itself or, 
more accurately, a poorly framed statement of work.  On this basis, it might be tempting 
to argue for eliminating the contract—if the contract is the source of the hazard, why not 
eliminate the contract?  Merely shifting to another provider, e.g., a US military provider, 
will not resolve the problem if the customer continues to misstate its needs; moreover, 
shifting from contract personnel to troops could reduce the availability of troops for other 
activities that only they can perform. 
Framing can be made better or worse with performance standards.  In a 
performance-based contract, such standards do not specify “how”; rather, they clarify 
“what” and, ideally, provide an objective basis for evaluation.  Without standards, the 
contractor may substitute its own or other commonly accepted standards and may 
provide the wrong service or the wrong amount of service.  However, if standards are 
overly prescriptive they may negate intended flexibility. 
A lack of performance standards may also contribute to so-called gold-plating, in 
which a contractor provides better or more service than is necessary at a higher cost.  
But, gold-plating cannot occur without willing participants on both sides of the contractual 
table.  A CPAF contract might create incentives to over-provide by rewarding higher-
quality service with a higher performance rating, but the customer must approve the 
contractor’s plan, negotiate the cost estimate, and authorize reimbursements for actual 
costs.  Ultimately, it takes two—or more—to gold-plate effectively. 
                                                
8 Separate from concerns about intentional cost inflation, realized costs might be higher than 
expected costs within the confines of “reasonable, allowable, and allocable.” 
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Other possible sources of hazard include ambiguous roles and responsibilities 
and inadequate communication and coordination.  For example, a contract that calls for 
weekly deliveries of fuel oil should specify whether the contractor or the customer is 
providing the fuel, the truck, or the security.  If the customer is providing any of these 
goods or services, it must be aware of and plan for its commitment; moreover, the 
customer must communicate with the contractor and vice versa, e.g., regarding 
timetables and whereabouts, to coordinate activities. 
More recently, attention has turned to two other issues involving “roles and 
responsibilities,” those of chain of command and protections under international law.  
Contractors operate through the contracting chain of command and outside the military 
chain of command, which has raised concerns about responsiveness in the field; in 
some circumstances, their standing under international law is uncertain, which has 
raised concerns about their security.9 
BSC Performance 
Realized hazards under the BSC have involved day-to-day activities, with 
unsatisfactory outcomes arising from poorly stated service or work orders, inadequate 
communication and coordination, and incentives to accept higher costs in exchange for 
higher quality.  Higher-order concerns have not borne fruit. 
A GAO10 report (2000a) on controlling costs in the BSC describes an instance in 
which planned firefighting services would have been too costly and potentially 
unsupportable, but available evidence strongly suggests that a lack of performance 
standards and communication between the customer and contractor contributed to the 
conflict.  Concerns about unnecessary redundancy in power generation also seem to 
have had their roots, at least partly, in standards and communication issues.  The GAO 
report also suggests instances of gold-plating.  It describes spending on base camp 
personalization, e.g., changing street names for each new rotation of troops. 
Another GAO report (2000b) issued at about the same time finds a high level of 
customer satisfaction with services under the BSC.  The concurrent release of the two 
GAO reports—one criticizing spending and the other praising quality-of-life—calls to 
mind the inherent tension between cost and quality.  The two reports address different 
costs and qualities, but the juxtaposition is striking. 
Acknowledging a need to better control costs, the Army responded to the GAO 
by clarifying its service requirements, by publishing a handbook of performance 
standards,11 and by placing greater emphasis on cost, especially in performance criteria.  
It re-oriented the criteria to weigh cost more heavily and to require ongoing reductions. 
                                                
9 For background on these issues, see Department of the Army (2003); for a more general 
discussion of concerns about readiness in this and other contracts, see GAO (2003). 
10 GAO is now known as the “US Government Accountability Office”; at the time of the report cited 
here, it was known as the “US General Accounting Office.” 
11 The Army issued a call to more closely scrutinize services just prior to the publication of the 
GAO report. 
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The Army’s response may reflect a natural shift in priorities.  At the start of an 
operation, the Army may seek to allocate managerial talent and manpower to mission-
essential activities; it may be more willing—and able—to devote these resources to 
controlling costs as the operation proceeds. 
Lessons for Future Operations 
The foregoing analysis applies the US military’s risk-management framework to 
the BSC to consider hazards, both prospectively and retrospectively.  The results 
suggest four general lessons for future operations. 
First, not all risks are inherently contractual.  Few of the hazards uncovered in 
the BSC were “contractual” per se; most were environmental or activity-based, including 
those stemming from trade-offs that the Army—or any customer—routinely faces, 
regardless of the provider.  Were the hazards attributed solely to contracting, any 
subsequent risk controls (including any decisions to replace contract personnel with 
troops) might be ineffectual or worse.  Staffing with troops will not guarantee the “right” 
services if the customer asks for the “wrong” services; alternatively, a staffing mandate 
will not correct a statement of work, but may incur unnecessary costs. 
But, risks are not identical across providers.  The probability and severity of 
hazards and the costs of controls may differ by type of provider, as in the case of 
security requirements.  Moreover, in some instances, the hazards themselves will differ, 
as when concerns arise about the chain of command or about the status of contractor 
employees under international law.  Clearly, the results of the analysis will be 
circumstance-specific and will depending on conditions in the operating environment. 
The real lesson is to compare risks, controls, and costs across potential service 
providers—be they contractors, US military, host nation, or otherwise—considering both 
common and unique hazards and conditions in the operating environment.  For example, 
a contractor’s employees may require more security than US military personnel, 
especially in an unstable operating environment, such as at or near the battlefield, but 
the Army may still use fewer resources on balance if opts for the contactor. 
Second, risk is dynamic, and appropriate responses may change over time.  
Prominent concerns at the start of an operation may differ vastly from those at the end of 
an operation.  Action typically dominates the start.  Initially, the customer must focus on 
getting the job done and might be willing to pay a premium to do so, especially if it 
means increasing mission effectiveness by freeing up managerial talent and manpower 
for other purposes.  The customer, either explicitly or implicitly, may be considering the 
“price” of controlling cost in the face of other resource constraints.  However, as the 
operation proceeds and conditions stabilize, concerns about cost tend to increase.  GAO 
criticisms of the BSC and the Army’s response suggest that cost became a more central 
theme as conditions stabilized in the Balkans. 
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Third, the contract is only as good as its customer.  The success of a contract 
hinges first on its design and then on its execution, including the selection process, 
management, and oversight.12  This means that the customer must be able to: 
 Clearly establish and articulate its needs, including its preferences for cost and 
quality in the face of tradeoffs; 
 Carefully review the contractor’s plans, firmly negotiate appropriate cost 
estimates, and judge the validity of actual costs; 
 Uphold its preferences during the performance-evaluation process; and 
 Communicate effectively, coordinate activities, and respond to changes in the 
operating environment as they arise. 
Here too, the customer faces a potential hazard; that is, if it is overly prescriptive 
in stating its needs, it may lose some of the flexibility it initially sought in the contract, 
especially in a performance-based, IDIQ contract. 
A participatory “cast of thousands” may bring a richness of talents, skills, and 
other resources to the contract, but it also adds complexity and potential conflict to 
design and execution.  By implication, each participant—not just a single monolithic 
customer—must understand the terms of the contract and, as already noted, its roles 
and responsibilities under the contract.13 
For all these reasons, good training, especially with potentially less familiar 
constructs like CPAF contracting, is essential. 
Fourth, risk management is not risk elimination.  Not all risk can or should be 
eliminated, but decisions about how much risk to accept should be made consciously 
and intentionally with adequate information.  The Army—or any other customer—can 
structure a contract to address many forms of risk, but it may want or need to tolerate 
some.  The costs of controls might be too high in view of the probability and severity of 
the consequences.  Moreover, as conditions in the operating environment change, 
decisions about risk controls and acceptance may also change. 
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